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MULTI-VOICED LANGUAGE IN 'SOCIETY OF DEMOCRACY': HARMONY FAR BEYOND BEING HUMAN

'Demokrasi Toplumu'nda Çok-Sesli Dil: İnsan Olmanın Ötesinde Bir Harmoni

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Abstract

In the history of political thought and society, it became very difficult to define a democratic society. This difficulty mainly stems from the questions such as what democracy is and how it is accomplished in various societies. This is a long path of a question; because story of democracy is a long way down in the socio-political history. The issue of what the democracy is varies from one to another in both individual and societal level. The issue of how it is achieved in various societies is a problematic of the comparative politics. A democracy by definition is government through elected representatives. However, in this definition, democracy-society relationship is more significant than being represented through free and fair elections; because democracy should mainly enable a form of society, which favors equal rights, freedom of speech and a fair trial and tolerates the views of minorities. A healthy civil society requires responsible and active citizens who value the system of government and work towards a shared vision of civil life. That is why a healthy society of democracy comprises the harmony of language in terms of being multi-voiced. Good citizenship values and models responsible behavior, attitudes and democratic values. Thus, values such as inclusion, participation and freedom are indispensable parts of a multi-voiced society's common democratic way of life. They reflect robust commitment to a multicultural and environmentally sustainable society where all are entitled to justice. Therewithal, this study will explore that being a human is not enough for being in a society since societies of democracy with harmony of multi-voiced languages is far beyond feeling oneself as a human being.

Keywords: democracy, society, individual, societal harmony, equality.

Öz

Siyasi düşünce ile toplumsal tarihte, demokratik bir toplumu tanımlamak hayli güç olagelmiştir. Bu husus, temelde demokrasi nedir ve çeşitli toplumlarda nasıl başarılabilir gibi sorulardan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu, çok uzun soluklu bir sorudur; zira demokrasinin hikayesi de sosyo-politik tarihte uzun bir yola sahiptir. Demokrasi nedir konusu gerek bireysel, gerekse toplumsal düzeyde birinden ötekine değişen bir olgudur. Demokrasi farklı toplumlarda nasıl başarılabilir konusu ise karşılaştırmalı siyasetin bir sorunsalıdır. Tanımsal olarak demokrasi, seçilmiş temsilciler yoluyla yönetimdir. Bununla birlikte, bu tanımda demokrasi-toplum ilişkisi, serbest ve adil seçimler kanalıyla temsil edilmekten daha önemlidir; keza

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demokrasi esasta, eşit haklar, ifade özgürlüğü ve adil yargılama sağlayan ve azınlıkların görüşlerine de hoşgörü gösteren bir toplumsal yapıyı oluşturabilmelidir. Sağlıklı bir sivil toplum, hükümet sistemine değer veren ve paylaşımcı vizyona sahip bir sivil yaşam için çalışan sorumlu ve aktif yurttaşlar ister Bu nedenle, sağlıklı bir demokrasi toplumu, çok sesli olma anlamında bir dil harmonisi bünyesinde barındırır. İyi yurttaşlık, sorumlu davranış, tutum ve demokratik değerleri model alır ve bunlara değer verir. Böylece, kapsayıcılık, katılım ve özgürlük gibi değerler, cok-sesli bir toplumun ortak demokratik yaşam biçiminin vazgeçilemez kısımlarıdır. Bunlar, herkesin adalete hakkı olduğu, çokkültürlü ve çevresel olarak sürdürülebilir bir topluma güçlü taahhütünü gösterir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma, insan olmanın bir toplumda yaşamakla yeterlilik kazanamayacağını ortaya koymaya çalışırken, bunun sebebinin çok sesliliğin harmonisine sahip demokratik toplumların, birinin kendisini insan hissetmesinin de ötesinde bir şey olduğunu göstermeye çalışacaktır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: demokrasi, toplum, birey, toplumsal harmoni, eşitlik.

“*When everybody participates, democracy flourishes.*” (Butler, 2000)

Introduction

Democracy coincides with both economical and mindful enlightenment. One of them is not enough for democracy to flourish. As Butler (2000) once emphasized; “*Power is not stable or static, but is remade at various junctures within everyday life; it constitutes our tenuous sense of common sense, and is ensconced as the prevailing epistemes of a culture. Moreover, social transformation occurs not merely by rallying mass numbers in favour of a cause, but precisely through the ways in which daily social relations are rearticulated, and new conceptual horizons opened up by anomalous and subversive practices.*” Thus, if the power of intellectual and secular brain is important to be far beyond a human on earth, then a democracy of society is quite different than a society of democracy. While these two terms of definition look similar to each other, one should read line breaks discreetly in order to make a subtle differentiation between these two terms. It is due to the fact that sometimes terms seem having the same meaning; however, this is a dillisuion which stemms from not being so prudent or to be in an implausible hurry when we hear the term “democracy” that gives one a comfortable feeling and illusional sense.

In the classical definition, a democracy is a society in which all adults have easily accessible, meaningful, and effective ways; (1) to participate in the decision-making processes of every organization that makes decisions or takes actions that affect them; (2) to hold other individuals, and those in these organizations who are responsible for making decisions and taking actions, fully accountable if their decisions or actions violate fundamental human rights, or are dishonest, unethical, unfair, secretive, inefficient, unrepresentative, unresponsive or irresponsible. However, there are political, economical, even cultural connotation attached to a democratic society. The fundamental doctrine on which a democratic society is based is the power, which is exercised by people of the society. Therefore, in a Nazi or in fascist society or any society ruled by king or queen, democracy will not survive. Thus, it seems crystal-clear that political aspects of a democratic society are freedom of speech, right to equality, right to be heard etc. Economical aspects of a democratic society are right to livelihood, right to profession, right to form an enterprise etc. Cultural aspects of democratic society are right to possess any religion, religious freedom. In a nutshell, a democratic society speaks of freedom with free speech. Now literally, if one asks for what constitutes a democratic society, it would be innovation, free thinking, growth, realization of power by people.

Nevertheless, in the history of political thought and society, it became very difficult to define a democratic society. This difficulty mainly stems from the questions such as what democracy is and how it is accomplished in various societies. This is a long path of a

question; because story of democracy is a long way down in the socio-political history. The issue of what the democracy is varies from one to another in both individual and societal level. The issue of how it is achieved in various societies is a problematic of the comparative politics. A democracy by definition is government through elected representatives. However, in this definition, democracy-society relationship is more significant than being represented through free and fair elections; because democracy should mainly enable a form of society, which favors equal rights, freedom of speech and a fair trial and tolerates the views of minorities. A healthy civil society requires responsible and active citizens who value the system of government and work towards a shared vision of civil life. That is why a healthy society of democracy comprises the harmony of language in terms of being multi-voiced. Good citizenship values and models responsible behavior, attitudes and democratic values. Thus, values such as inclusion, participation and freedom are indispensable parts of a multi-voiced society's common democratic way of life. They reflect robust commitment to a multicultural and environmentally sustainable society where all are entitled to justice.

Which Democracy: A Conceptual Review

Two main meanings of democracy drive us into a robust distinction in making plausible outcomes. Those consequences are quite considerable to recount. The term "democracy" is used in various senses. At the very least, a distinction should be made between democracy as an ideal of political association and democracy as a system of government. The former is an objective of collective action and is a value in itself. The latter is a means of achieving certain common objectives and its value lies in the extent to which it contributes to their achievement.

In the first sense, "democracy" is the "power of the people", where the "people" is the totality of the members of an association. "Democracy" denotes an association in which all the members control collective decisions and their execution, only having to obey themselves. In this form of community, there is no form of domination by a few persons over others. If everybody holds power, nobody is subject to anybody else. Democracy is the achievement of the freedom of everyone. It is a guiding concept, under the influence of which politics can progressively bring society closer to the ideal, although it can never be claimed that the ideal has been achieved in its entirety.

In its second meaning, "democracy" denotes a series of rules and institutions, which support a system of power. These include the equality of citizens before the law, civil rights, citizens' election of their leaders, the principle of needing a majority to take decisions, and the separation of powers. It is not an ideal, but a form of government that conforms to certain procedures and which can be achieved in various ways, according to the circumstances. It is not an associative project conforming to specific values, but rather a way of living together under a specific power system. Indeed, based on how it operates in many countries, "democracy" can easily be reduced to this second meaning, if the ideal of democracy is abandoned as being Utopian. In other terms, democracy can be considered as a system whereby various individuals or groups agree upon a means of coexistence in association together without destroying each other. In this case, there is no reason to seek the moral justification of democracy, and it can simply be accepted or refuted for reasons of convenience (Villoro, 1998: 95).

In theory, democracy is government by the people for the people. However, in practice, it has taken a different route. Democratic procedures were conceived to achieve that objective, but deviated towards a different political system. Some of the causes of this deviation have their roots in specific historical circumstances and situations which

offered resistance to democratization, while, in other cases, they have been due to the intrinsic characteristics of the very rules and institutions through which it was intended to assure government by the people. Only these latter are of interest to us here (Biko, 2012: 1; Butler et al. 2000).

The emergence of democracy was closely related to the establishment of modern nation-states in the North American war of independence, the French Revolution and the birth of independent States in other parts of the world. Indeed, the nation-state is conceived as a homogenous unity established by decision of a totality of individuals who are equal among themselves. It ignores or destroys the multiplicity of groups, communities, peoples and ways of life that make up real societies in order to establish a uniform legal and political order and an administrative system over them. The "people" on which it deposits sovereignty is the totality of "citizens" (Laclau, 2005: Lemert, 2010). However, the citizen is not an actual person conditioned by his or her social situation, belonging to specific groups or communities, who differs from others by reason of her or his particular characteristics. Rather, he or she is a mere subject of civil and political rights that are the same for all. As citizens, all individuals are treated the same, with no consideration of their differences. The people is perceived as being made up of citizens who form a uniform entity composed of undifferentiated units. It holds sway over all the diversities, which go to make up the real people. Current democratic institutions are based on this substitution of the real people by a nation of citizens. In addition, it is at this stage that social realities betray the people since, once established, democratic institutions lead to a new form of domination of the people in the name of the people. The end of the 20th century provides clear indications of this deviation of democracy towards a new system of domination, which can be described under three principal headings (Lummis, 1996). Thus, in a reduced democracy, those are representation, bureaucracy and technocracy. However, if by democracy we mean the power of the real people, we are seeing a decisive reduction in democracy, which is being confiscated from the people with its consent, by an establishment that takes decisions in its stead and which in turn depends partially on outside decisions. This confiscation of the power of the people is not a result of forces that are opposed to democracy, nor of a coup d'etat or a popular revolution, but of the development of the institutions and practices, which go to make up democracy itself (Smith, 1998; Tefsai, 1996).

Democratic institutions were designed to achieve the ideal of the self-government of the people. Over the years, we have been able to judge the extent to which they have been able to achieve this ideal. However, the record is ambivalent. Real democracy has shown itself in practice to be an indispensable procedure to oppose arbitrary power. It is a necessary alternative to totalitarianism, dictatorship and disguised authoritarian regimes. It is a vital process in any liberation movement from oppressive systems. However, the same institutions that are designed to guarantee democracy have reached the point of restricting it, and even confiscating it from the people. It is not, nevertheless, a question of destroying these institutions, but rather of making them fulfil the functions for which they were conceived. Overcoming the restrictions inherent in democracy is a means of progressing towards radical democracy (Talisse, 2007; Graeber, 2013).

Radical democracy is that which returns to the people their capacity to participate actively in decision-making on all collective matters affecting their lives, with the result that the people only obeys its own soul. However, the real people is not the sum total of the undifferentiated individuals who are supposed to make up the homogenous nation-state. The real people is heterogeneous, made up of a multiplicity of inter-related communities, towns, social organizations, groups, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities,

classes, professional associations, confessions, sects and federations, which are all different, and sometimes opposed. A member of the people is an abstract citizen who is equal to all other individuals. He or she is a person who is a member of various social entities, belonging to different groups and cultures, with his or her own characteristics and distinct identity. He or she is a person in a specific situation, in contact with local systems. The exercise of personal independence means the taking of decisions, which affect an individual's own life, in a specific context, and therefore participating in collective decisions to the extent that they affect that person's own situation. Radical democracy has its basis in the power of this real people. In this sense, it is an ideal. Its full achievement would probably be impossible. However, it is not possible to come any closer to it if we do not allow it to guide political practice (Villoro, 1998: 96-100; Wolin, 2008; Dewey, 1987; Fink, 1995; Mouffe, 1993; 2000; O'Donnell, 2004).

"Society of Democracy" vs. "Democratic Society": Theoretical Perspectives on Political Participation

The concept of political participation refers to normative and operational difficulties of conceptualizing political participation and it varies from the wide to the narrow sense of a notion of political participation (Conway, 1991; Kaase and March, 1979; Marsh and Kaase, 1979; Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba and Nie, 1972; Parry et al. 1992; Verba et al. 1995). Political participation in this study refers to "*activities of citizens that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government authorities, or the policies of government.*" (Conway, 1991: 4)

Political participation modes can include conventional and unconventional actions. 'Conventional political participation' refers to those modes that a dominant political culture recognizes as acceptable and that are related to institutionalized actions (Conway, 1991: 20). Unconventional political participation refers to those modes that fail short of laws and customary norms of a specific society and relate to non-institutionalized actions frequently directed against the system itself that at least aim at transforming its sociopolitical structure (Kaase and March, 1979: 41).

'Socioeconomic status perspective' refers to explanatory capacities of individual factors such as education, profession, income, age, gender and religion and concludes that socioeconomic factors have an impact on political participation (Milbrath and Goel, 1977; Conway, 1991; Parry et al. 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Verba et al. 2000). Education "promotes political participation in two ways: by giving people the knowledge and skills that facilitate participation and by placing people in social networks that inform them about politics and reward political action" (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). An important indicator of skills and social contacts is profession (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993: 77). Individuals may acquire civic skills at the institutions, which they encounter during their lifetime (Verba et al. 1995). The longer people live, the more knowledge, skills and social contacts they acquire (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Individual resources model starts with the idea that individual resources such as money, skills, knowledge, time and self-confidence have an impact on political participation, because they allow people to meet the economic and psychological costs of political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al. 1995).

'Social capital perspective' refers to the explanatory capacities of social capital. Putnam (1993: 167) argues that social capital is "*features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and social networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.*" Voluntary organizations generate social capital by encouraging

interpersonal trust, supporting norms of reciprocity and providing networks of social relations. Putnam (1993) indicates that associations foster the general reciprocity, which helps to overcome the problems of free-riders in democracy. Participating in associations, individuals develop cognitive and deliberative skills, civic virtues, and a sense of efficacy (Badescu, 2003). Verba et al. (1995) argue that associations teach their members organizational skills. Associations provide the social infrastructure for public deliberation and setting of an agenda. Associations with private or nonpolitical purposes (self-help groups, sports clubs, and choral societies) contribute to the public sphere less in comparison with political organizations (Fung, 2003).

An important attribute of civil society is the existence of informal social networks that must be composed of "weak ties". "Weak ties" are more likely to link members of different groups than "strong" ties that concentrate on a particular group (Granovetter, 1973: 1376). At the level of the individual citizen, civil society requires a specific set of attitudes and behavioral orientations towards politics, including a certain style of interpersonal interaction and collaboration (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998).

Political participation in a cultural perspective addresses the impact of values and attitudes on political participation (Inglehart, 1979; 1997). The shift from materialist to postmaterialist values includes cognitive mobilization and increase in efficacy (Inglehart, 1979; Kaase and Marsh 1979). Uslaner and Brown (2005: 869) indicate that "*…greater equality and higher levels of trust are two pathways to participation.*" Inequality may depress participation, either directly or indirectly, through its effects on trust. Where inequality is higher, the poor may feel powerless and they will think that their views are not represented in the political system and therefore they will opt out of civic engagement (Uslaner and Brown, 2005). Trust in others rests on a foundation of economic equality; "*When resources are distributed inequitably, people at the top and the bottom will not see each other as facing a shared fate.*" (Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 869). Trust rests on a psychological foundation of optimism and control over one's environment; "*Where inequality is high, people will be less likely to believe that the future looks bright, and they will have even fewer reasons to believe that they are the masters of their own fate.*" (Uslaner and Brown, 2005: 869)

Rapid economic restructuring caused new patterns of social stratification and inequality in post-communist countries. The transition from the state to market economy has created different economic opportunities and the need for different individual resources in comparison with the socialist economy. It caused rapid social differentiation and a rapid increase in economic inequality in the society. Related to the transition from totalitarianism to the institutions of democracy, it also increased a gap between the government officials and ordinary citizens (Thomassen and van Deth, 1998: 119). There exists a relationship between the perceptions of the economy and democracy in post-communist countries (Pacek, 1994; Paczynska, 2005). Furthermore, the transition from socialism to the market economy is related to the transition from the collective to individualistic culture (Triandis, 1993; Imbrasaitė, 2010).

From Local to Global: Democracy's Resilience in a Changing World and Societal Order

All countries must address complex challenges that, whether originating within or outside of their borders, have a global reach: from food scarcity to conflict, from climate change to terrorism and organized crime, and from populism to corruption. However, in my opinion, this is an incomplete overview of the problem. It is easy to lose sight of the long-term

gains the world has made in maintaining democracy. By and large, public institutions today are more representative and accountable to the needs and desires of women and men of all ages. Over the past several decades, many states have become democratic and, notwithstanding obstacles and some setbacks, most of them have maintained that status. Today, more countries hold elections than ever before. Crucially, most governments respect their international commitments to uphold fundamental rights, more individuals are able to freely cast their votes, and civil society and its leaders can mobilize and engage in dialogue with political leaders. Overall, democracy has produced a domino effect, growing and spreading across the planet.

Governments should build on this strong foundation in order to reduce the risk of backsliding towards authoritarianism. Regrettably, in too many cases, electoral results are not respected or institutions and rules are manipulated to keep leaders in power indefinitely. This prevents citizens from accessing the basic elements of freedom and equality that democracy champions (Int. IDEA, 2017: vi). Democratization processes over the last four decades have created many opportunities for public participation in political life. More people today live in electoral democracies than ever before. However, numerous countries grapple with challenges to democracy, contributing to the perception that democracy is in ‘decline’ or has experienced ‘reversals’ or ‘stagnation’. Some of these challenges relate to issues of corruption, money in politics and policy capture, inequality and social exclusion, migration or post-conflict transition to democracy. Many leaders and democratic actors continue to manipulate democratic processes and institutions, which often contributes to democratic backsliding in their respective countries (Bekaj, 2017: viii).

Democracy has grown impressively from the 1970s to the 2000s. Yet in 2017, despite democracy’s long-term resilience, it appears to be fragile in many countries. From new populist movements that threaten the rights of minorities to the stark challenges of corruption and state capture, democratic institutions are vulnerable to setbacks, the erosion of rights and the manipulation of electoral processes. Concerns about democracy’s health have raised an important question: What makes democracy more resilient? This chapter explores the global state of democracy by exploring the conditions for its resilience. How can citizens resist illiberal or autocratic regimes? When do checks and balances among institutions prevent state capture and backsliding? How can structural risks to democracy in underlying social and political relationships be reduced? Can democracy be designed to be more resilient? What roles do outsiders play in protecting democracy from peril when it is under threat? The chapter concludes with a set of recommendations for building more resilient democracies to face these challenges and to weather the crises that lie ahead (Sisk, 2017: 36).

What makes democracy resilient? Concern has grown from scholars and policymakers over the possible global decline of democracy worldwide (Annan, 2016). Amid global unease over the rise of populism and ‘strong-leader’ autocrats, or the endemic challenges of state capture and corruption in many countries, enthusiasm for democracy seems to have decreased: doubts have arisen about its ability to address the contemporary problems of providing peace and security and broad-based human development. Although democracy is currently under threat, it remains an ideal and a best-possible governance system. Democratic values among citizens, and within institutions and processes at the national and international levels, have proven to be remarkably resilient in many ways. Democracy’s values are historically longstanding and enduring, even though the ideals have been subject to criticism from many philosophical and practical perspectives over time (Dahl, 1989; Denyer, 2016). Democracy reflects a core value enshrined in article 21

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the “will of the people” is the basis for the legitimacy and authority of sovereign states; it reflects a common and universal desire for peace, security and justice. The article stipulates that: (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives, (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country, (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Democracy reflects the fundamental ethical principles of human equality and the dignity of persons, and is thus inseparable from human rights (Beetham et al., 2008). Its core principles are manifested in different ways: the institutions, processes and elements of democracy such as electoral systems or arrays of institutions have grown organically and uniquely in various countries (Beetham et al., 2008; Held, 2006). Modern analysis must account for the wide variation in the norms, institutions and processes that collectively comprise today’s democracies that goes far beyond traditional theories of liberalism or social democracy; democratic variation requires careful, close-in analysis of how local models reflect or detract from broad democratic values (Youngs, 2015).

The gaps between the international norms of the ‘right’ to democracy and its implementation, particularly in elections, are often at odds with the realities of managed elections, in which the rules of the game are biased. Participation is often managed and the playing field is unfair, and the results at times are fraudulent and lack credibility, resulting in “flawed or failed contests” that “can undoubtedly wreck fragile progress” (Norris, 2014: 3). Democratic rights are often overlooked in the localized political realities of state ‘capture’, particularly in countries with abundant export-valuable natural resource commodities. Some citizens have turned to extremist political solutions, which threaten the foundations of human rights, democracy and peace that have characterized the post-World War II international system. Yet democracy shows considerable signs of resilience. Resilience is defined as a political system’s ability to cope with, survive and recover from complex challenges and crises that present stress or pressure that can lead to systemic failure. Resilient social systems are flexible (able to absorb stress or pressure), can recover from challenges or crises, adaptable (can change in response to a stress to the system), and innovative (able to change in order to more efficiently or effectively addresses the challenge or crisis) (Sisk, 2017).

Democracy has been imperiled in the last 50 years of the world. We could start this with the year of 1975. Since 1974, a third wave of democratization has emerged in a clear pattern of transitions from authoritarian rule and civil war towards the adoption of new, democratic constitutions, electoral processes, and broadening freedoms and participation (Brown, 2011; Møller and Skaaning, 2013). The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s triggered another wave of democracy that extended unprecedented freedoms to countries in Europe. Democracy thrived and deepened to become the world’s principal form of governing institutions, and the quality of democracy expanded gradually in both established democracies and those that have transitioned since the 1970s. Development proceeded rapidly around the world: there was steady progress in human development in 2000-2015 through the attainment in many countries of the Millennium Development Goal targets of reducing poverty, advancing the rights of women and girls, and improving access to clean water and sanitation (UN, 2015). Countries that successfully transitioned from authoritarian rule or civil war to democracy in the period 1974–2015 did so through domestic or national processes of negotiation and reform, at times with support from the international community (Stoner and McFaul, 2013; Ould-Mohammedou and Sisk, 2016).

Challenges affecting contemporary democracies could not be overlooked in this sense. Drivers of demographic, economic and social forces appear to be the root causes of authoritarian resurgence, contentious politics and democratic decline globally (Human Rights Council, 2012). Some observers link these trends to the regression of democracy: they contend that globalization processes have induced social exclusion and contention, which present new and fundamental challenges for democracy (Munck, 2002). In the post-globalization world of economic interdependence, these challenges interact with national and local contexts to produce localized social dislocation and grievances. Countries face tremendous pressure on governance in response to climate change and the effects of extreme weather events and natural disasters on land, water, biodiversity and the oceans. Research has linked environmental pressures to the vulnerability of communities and countries to conflict: governance institutions face the potential of environmentally driven conflicts at the local and national levels (often related to land and extractive industries); without 'good' governance, institutions may escalate into violence (UNEP, 2004).

The Independent Commission on Multilateralism (2016) identified several challenges that governments and societies face, including environmental challenges stemming from climate change effects, social pressures from changing communities, economic issues such as youth unemployment, and management of natural resources and valuable commodities. Migration is a serious transnational challenge to democracy that has led to social polarization, xenophobia and anti-immigrant movements in many countries (Piper and Rother, 2015). While migration generally produces net positive economic effects for recipient societies (UNDP, 2009), migration and debates over immigration policy and responses have created new strains for many democracies. Countries as varied as Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa and the USA face migration-related pressures, and have seen violence against immigrants.

Among the most difficult and challenging global problems with local effects is ensuring security and combating terrorism; many governments justify restrictions of rights and freedoms with the need to prevent terrorism. Increasing terrorist attacks have had deleterious effects on democracy, most notably in relation to the restrictions on freedoms associated with responses to terrorist events (Chenoweth, 2013; Large, 2006). In many contexts, however, discontent with democracy stems from the internal challenges found in local-level economic, demographic and social contexts. In many societies, persistent socio-economic inequality and marginalization destabilize the political process and support for institutions: democracy does not appear to change the challenges of everyday life for people living in poverty or those who face other social disadvantages.

Thus, it is now vital to reaffirm democracy as a value system for governance and as a form of government. Ruling regimes typically profess their commitment to democratic principles, and to universal human rights, as a system of laws, institutions and practices through which state authority is legitimized. According to International IDEA's Voter Turnout Database (2016), 186 countries held legislative elections in the period 2011–15, with nearly 3.37 billion voters. More countries have the basic framework of democratic institutions and processes now than ever before. In the 21st century, state legitimacy originates from democratic processes that empower the state to provide security and deliver services (ostensibly, further enhancing its legitimacy) (OECD-DAC, 2010).

In this context, democracy's long-term utility seems to include mainly peace and prosperity. There is increasing consensus that democracy -as an enduring set of values and principles and as a form of government- is a fundamental building block of human

progress. Democracy is a form of non-violent conflict management that can reconcile divisions and contention within society; it is the basis of sustainable peace within countries. While authoritarian governments may be 'resilient', they do so at the cost of human rights. For years, scholars have argued that democracy generally contributes to international peace -the 'democratic peace theory' holds that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies- and can enable an internal 'democratic peace': democracies are less likely to experience internal social conflict that can escalate to civil war (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Russet and Oneal, 2001). In addition to its intrinsic value, democracy has enduring instrumental utility for development and peace (Sen, 1999a; 1999b). It facilitates the equality of citizens' voices, and thus allows for the expression of interests and preferences and the free flow of information, both of which are essential elements of development. The sustainability of the social contract within countries is assured through inclusion, while participation in governance is undergirded by the protection of fundamental rights. Policy practice in international organizations has evolved since the founding of the UN and the modern Bretton Woods system to recognize that goals such as development and growth, prevention of conflict, and broadening participation, dignity, equity and sustainability must be pursued simultaneously. Democratic governance provides the normative framework through which policies to address these issues are 'formed and executed' (Asher et al., 2016: 80).

UN Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG16) builds on the premise that 'governance matters'. It states that peaceful and inclusive societies are central to achieving all other development goals. SDG16's promotion of 'peaceful and inclusive societies' and 'effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions' reflects a commonly accepted understanding that democracy, peace and development outcomes are inherently intertwined, and that reducing violence, delivering justice and combatting corruption are all essential to achieving sustainable development (Jandl, 2017). Democracy is seen as an institutional and enduring means of resolving and preventing social conflict, and thus democratic governance contributes to peace, which in turn contributes to development opportunities (Brown, 2003). Greater inclusivity over time contributes to democratic accountability: democracy introduces a culture of equality that empowers historically marginalized people; inclusion helps create the 'demand side' necessary for creating the will for the state to respond on the 'supply side'. The key to democracy's contribution to development is its ability to non-violently manage conflict as a first-order priority, and subsequently to extend and improve government services over time. Democracy, peace and development work together over the long term to provide a virtuous cycle of progress even as patterns and progress vary by context. Cross-cutting civil society engagement in democratic transitions has been found to be associated with a reduced risk of terror attacks in a cross-country analysis (Pospieszna, 2015).

However, the 21st century offered promise as rapid technological innovations helped bring unparalleled development and continued gains in democracy, fundamental rights and prosperity. Yet, in 2017 the world is fragmented, conflicted and under threat from global challenges such as climate change, migration and widening socioeconomic inequality—the effects of which undermine social cohesion, put peace at risk, and threaten to reverse hard-won 20th-century gains in all world regions. It is a tenuous moment for democracy. New challenges, if not adequately addressed, endanger democracy in today's complex world. The contemporary global, regional and country-specific landscape of democracy has rapidly evolved in recent years, raising questions about democracy's ability to thrive amid recent challenges and crises (Sisk, 2017: 38).

Patterns of Participation vs. Harmony of Participation in a "Society of Democracy"

Participation is the basic element of life; actually of a participatory life. One cannot be lonely; and never been lonely in the human history. Thus, basic of life is sharing life in one way or another; or in a manner. If one is excluded from something, then one thinks whether he/she is guilty; he/she is not entitled or not. We may add the list many other suspicions. Therefore, in a society, citizen participation is a key indicator of the performance of democracy (Conway, 1991; Kaase and Marsh, 1979; Parry et al. 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba et al. 1995). The quality and quantity of political participation has an important role in the representation of citizen needs and preferences. Pateman (1970: 105) argues that "*...we do learn to participate by participating and feelings of political efficiency are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment.*" Participation in political life develops civic competence and responsibility. The experience of political activities are important and valuable itself. The legitimation of democratic institutions and the institutionalization of conventional modes of participation are extremely essential during the period of consolidation of democracy (Valionis, 2000; 2001). Conventional modes of political participation constitute a precondition for a stable democratic system (Kaase and Marsh, 1979; Valionis, 2000; 2001). However, voting at elections is only one form of numerous forms of political participation. If citizens have the possibility to exercise control over political leaders only through elections, their role in the political process is that of a "controller" but not that of a "participant" (Parry et al. 1992). Conventional political actions of individuals such as contacting politicians, government or municipality officials and organizations, letter writing, involvement in election campaigns through wearing and distributing badges and posters and financial contributions inform political elite about citizens' interests, preferences and needs. unconventional political actions may be dysfunctional with respect to the performance of democratic institutions during the period of consolidation of democracy (Valionis, 2000; 2001; Imbrasaitė, 2010: 43).

Regular patterns of democratic participation mostly coincides with the harmony of democracy and democratized-type of participation in modern societies. This is in line with the weakness of theoretical basis of democracy. In theory, at first our minds should be democratic. Nevertheless, before our minds, our souls, spirits and visions should be democratic. Then, shortly our mentality and understanding should certainly become democratic. According to all versions of democratic theory, however they may differ on the extent to which fully democratic institutions are thought to be practicable, "democracy" is about the authorship of collective decisions. People who are subject to laws are to be treated as if they willingly subjected themselves to such laws—to endorse their own personhood and to firmly ground a sense of collective agency. This ideal notion of authorship is of course not reducible to the actual making of decisions, particularly not in a system of representative government. Still, even democratic minimalists have suggested that at the very least this notion of expressive agency has to include some sense on the part of citizens that they can in different ways initiate political activity and influence public opinion. Thus, it is basic to democratic theory that the idea and practices of democracy include some continual mediation between collective self-determination and the individual self-determination of particular citizens. It follows that some kind of equality of participation and discourse is needed for this mediation, so that citizens can feel that their own agency in political matters can potentially have an effect in the larger society. It is not simply, then, that public opinion must be responsive to individuals; rather, it is that individuals, in accordance with the ideal of their ultimate authorship of the laws that apply to them, must have some actual impact on the form and content of

law. Obviously, if conditions are such that citizens come to feel that they can have no impact and that laws are made by those who in no way seem to take heed of or to need to take heed of their views, then the ideal of democratic government and the notion of authorship begins to unravel (Green and Cornell, 2005: 517-535).

In his classic work, Huntington (1968) described a simple but underappreciated phenomenon: when levels of political participation outpace the ability of institutions to channel that participation, societies are in danger of political instability, and political life takes on a more Machiavellian tone. He has been widely criticized for providing a theoretical justification of authoritarian regimes that offer some level of political stability. We now know, however, that authoritarianism does not necessarily or easily lead to the institutionalization of political life or to stable patterns of rule. More commonly, authoritarianism simply buries conflict under a layer of state-sponsored violence, which serves as a substitute for political authority, not as an example of it.

Then it seems that there are two main pillars of societies of democracy in order to become democratized in governance, participation, and societal harmony. That is why, dimensions of a democratic state capacity including institutions, autonomy, and accountability is quite significant in making a democratic society as society of democracy. In this respect, many of the problems of democratic governance can be summarized as weaknesses in at least one of three overlapping arenas: institutional capacity, autonomy, and/or accountability. In short, democratic governance is often found wanting because (a) states lack the institutional capacity to carry out some or all of their basic functions such as security, collection of revenue, and/or administration of law; (b) states lack autonomy from important societal actors such as business elites, the military, and/or organized social movements; and/or (c) institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability are undermined by powerful actors within the political system. In this study, from this point then on, we will try to contribute in showing both theoretically and empirically, the challenges inherent in 'addressing' this tripartite dilemma.

A vast swath of literature dating back decades explores various aspects of state building and state strengthening by focusing on particular states' institutional qualities, relative autonomy from particular domestic-based groups, or territorial reach. As Soifer and vom Hau (2008: 220) have argued, however, this conceptual balkanization obscures the fact that most scholars have, in fact, been studying a common object: infrastructural power (Mann, 1986: 4) – that is, "*the institutional capability to exercise control and implement policy choices within the territory it claims to govern.*" Giraudy (2012) has expanded on this definition and made it more empirically tractable by focusing on "diminished subtypes" of strong and weak states. Since very few states in the world can be unequivocally described as either strong or weak, a set of middle-ground concepts is useful. She does this by dividing state strength into three component parts that encompass Mann's concept of infrastructural power: territorial reach, autonomy from nonstate actors, and bureaucratic capacity. Using these three criteria, she then outlines a typology of states based on how well they meet these three criteria. At the extremes, a weak state would score poorly on all three measures, whereas a strong state would score well on each. Between these extremes she identifies categories such as "crony states" (which possess reach and capacity, but lack autonomy) and "nonreaching states" (which score well on capacity and autonomy, but lack reach), among others.

Although this is a useful contribution to debates on states and state building, neither Giraudy nor most other state-building scholars say much about how state leaders are chosen or to what ends they exercise whatever infrastructural power the state may have.

With good reason, scholars have tended not to include aspects of regime type (such as democracy) in their conceptualization of state strength, arguing that regime characteristics (e.g., respect for property rights, vertical and horizontal accountability, quality of political parties and electoral procedures) must be treated as conceptually separate from state characteristics (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008; Kurtz and Schrank, 2012). Although conceptually defensible, this analytical separation of democracy and stateless strength makes little practical sense when norms of democracy and human rights have become increasingly entrenched across the hemisphere. The idea that one can engage in the types of overtly violent statecraft that were plausible and frequently used during periods of state building in Europe and North America is unrealistic. For that reason, here enters the second key concept in this article: democracy. While a state's infrastructural power defines its 'ability' to act, democracy put limits on who controls those capacities and how they can be used. Whereas state building usually entails efforts to centralize power within a set of national institutions, democracy often works at cross-purposes to this goal by limiting the ability of state leaders to exercise power they might potentially possess.

This is particularly true in twenty-first century, for instance in Latin America, where – as Eaton (2012) has argued – three related structural processes have transformed the nature of the state: democratization, liberalization, and decentralization. According to Eaton, by changing what the state does relative to the market (liberalization), which level of the state provides which services (decentralization), and how those who control the state come to occupy those positions (democratization), the three overlapping transitions have introduced a tumultuous period for the state (Eaton, 2012: 646). This tumult has been most obvious in states where moves toward greater democracy have coincided with insurgencies (such as Colombia and Peru in the 1990s) that threaten the very existence of the state (Mauceri, 2004) or where powerful organized crime networks, often linked to the international narcotics trade (e.g., Mexico and much of Central America), undermine the authority and legitimacy of the state. From a historical perspective, there is ample evidence that effective state institutions are crucial to fostering economic development, independent of the specific economic policies being pursued (Coatsworth, 1998; Mahoney, 2010). However, the relationship between democracy and economic growth is causally complex and mediated by many intervening factors (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Gerring et al. 2005; Fukuyama and Colby, 2011).

Our first task at this stage of the study will be to theorize the democratic state (and processes of democratic state building). Building from an ideal type of the democratic state, we will focus on three conceptual pillars that would support such a state: institutional capacity, political autonomy, and vertical and horizontal accountability. As most cases around the world demonstrate, reforms that strengthen one pillar of democratic governance may directly undermine another. For example, the literature on state building is replete with arguments that link state formation to coercive behaviors that can only be described as antidemocratic (Tilly, 1985; Lopez-Alves, 2000; Centeno, 2002). Norms of democracy and human rights, therefore, serve as an important – if imperfect – check on contemporary state formation that did not exist in previous eras. It would be misleading to expect reforms that strengthen the state to be naturally congruent with norms of democracy.

To move from the coercive politics associated with the formation and strengthening of state institutions to effective democratic governance, state institutions must achieve some level of autonomy from powerful groups both inside and outside the bounds of state institutions. Within the state, threats to autonomy most often come from the military, the

bureaucracy, and political parties. Outside the state, such autonomy threatening groups might include religious organizations, paramilitary groups, economic elites, and organized social movements. States that lack sufficient autonomy from one or more of these groups regularly produce outcomes that are at odds with norms of democratic governance by skewing the policy-making process to such an extent that a small group of elites can reliably manipulate state institutions for their own benefit. Effective institutions of accountability strengthen the possibilities for state autonomy. O'Donnell (1994) usefully distinguished between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability exists when different state institutions are empowered to check the power of other parts of the state. Independent courts are classic institutions of horizontal accountability, as are the concurrent powers of legislative and executive branches (in presidential systems). Vertical accountability occurs when citizens have the ability to influence the behavior of their representatives, primarily by electing individuals to occupy important public offices and removing officials whose performance is judged to be subpar. Political parties are the classic institutions of vertical accountability. By providing voters with competing alternatives, parties present citizens with the information and organizational capacity to select and remove candidates from public office (Bowen, 2015: 90).

The ideal democratic state would perform well in each of these areas. It would possess a coherent bureaucracy with material and institutional resources that have equal and uniform reach throughout the entire geographic span of the state. These institutions would be able to carry out their duties independent of other centers of economic and political power (such as the military, economic elites, or unelected civil society leaders). Moreover, in our ideal-type state, leaders would be held accountable both vertically (by the country's citizens) and horizontally (through effective institutional checks and balances). Immediately, contradictions and vagaries jump to the fore. How do political leaders achieve the autonomy to make and implement policy without trampling institutions of accountability? In states that have historically lacked institutional capacity and (sometimes) territorial reach and where subnational elites of various stripes have been the direct beneficiaries of these weaknesses, how do leaders attempt to strengthen the capacity of state institutions without succumbing to the autonomy threatening demands of local power brokers who can potentially block state-building attempts (see for instance; Eaton, 2011)? (Bowen, 2015)

Then, following the logic described above, empirical arguments about societies of democracies in terms of comparative studies should consist of three main steps. First, one should explore institutional reforms designed to strengthen the capacity of the related state. One may use the areas of taxation and economic policy to illustrate how the capacity of key state institutions has improved over the past decade. Studying state formation in today's world means examining not only coercive institutions but also state institutions designed to manage a society's relationship to the capitalist world economy (Schneider, 2012). The ability to intervene effectively in the market is, after security functions, arguably any state's most important characteristic; in this respect, developing world states have demonstrated diverse capacities for such interventions (Kohli, 2004). Accordingly, one should focus on reforms that enhance the state's ability to collect taxes from difficult-to-tax constituencies and the ability of the state to formulate and implement economic regulations. Second, one should explore the question of state autonomy. Here one may describe efforts by related governments and presidents to make policy choices independent of important organized groups in society (namely, business groups and the country's indigenous movement). Finally, in the area of accountability, one had better discuss the collapse of party systems and domestic politicians' efforts to

build an effective political party. If this effort largely fails, accordingly, accountability will appear to be the weakest of related state's three "democratic legs." The specific aspects of institutional capacity, autonomy, and accountability one may have chosen to explore are intended to be illustrative and not comprehensive since they will provide a useful way of analyzing and understanding the competing imperatives of democratic governance in the developing world states (Bowen, 2015: 83-110).

Perspectives on Democratizing Societal Democracy through "Engendering Democracy"

Increasing numbers of women have gained entry into the arena of representative politics in recent times. Yet the extent to which shifts in the sex ratio within formal democratic spaces translates into political influence, and into gains in policies that redress gendered inequities and inequalities remains uncertain. At the same time, a plethora of new democratic spaces have been created – whether through the promotion of 'civil society organizations' or the institutionalization of participatory governance mechanisms – which hold the prospect of democratizing other political spaces beyond those of formal politics. Thus, we should examine factors that constrain and enable women's political effectiveness in these different democratic arenas. This will enable us to explore how a democratic society can transform into a society of democracy. By this view, we suggest that 'engendering democracy' by adding women or multiplying democratic spaces is necessary but not sufficient to address historically and culturally embedded forms of disadvantage that have been the focus for feminist politics. We also suggest that an important, but neglected, determinant of political effectiveness is women's political apprenticeship – their experiences in political parties, civil society associations and the informal arenas in which political skills are learned and constituencies built. Enhancing the democratizing potential of women's political participation calls for democratizing democracy itself: building new pathways into politics, fostering political learning and creating new forms of articulation across and beyond existing democratic spaces (Cornwall and Goetz, 2005: 783).

In this respect, feminizing legislatures is very significant in achieving and advancing gender equality in the way to a society of democracy. Therefore, we may argue this first step now. Clearly, if the concern is to bring gender equality perspectives into politics and public policy, a focus on packing public space with female bodies is misplaced unless supported by efforts to bring gender issues into the many other spaces where political interests are formed. Worse, it may actually undermine the project of enhancing gender equality. The 31 per cent female occupancy of assembly seats in Iraq, for instance, offers no protection against the conservative Islamist assault on the country's Ba'ath-era secular family law. A significant proportion of women in the assembly belong to the Islamist Shia list, and are at the forefront of calls to reinstate Sharia law in personal relationships. As Iraq's minister of women's affairs, the Sunni Kurd Narmeen Othman despairs; "*It is very difficult to fight this when their women politicians are advocating Sharia. The men say: "See you are wrong because even these women are supporting us.*" (The Wall Street Journal, 2005) Feminizing legislative delegations may have other undesirable effects. It may erode the quality of democracy and public deliberation where reservations have been a means of reinforcing the ruling party's position with female party 'hacks' unwilling to question authoritarian and highly centralized party leadership – as many claim is the case in Rwanda (The New York Times, 2005) and South Africa (Hassim, 2003).

Women may lack experience of public debate, opposition or deal-making, stemming from their shallow or skewed political apprenticeship, and this may make them ineffective legislators, or legislators who are easy to manipulate. Walsh (2002: 13 cit. in Meer, 1998: 163) describes how gender differences in debating styles, and the lack of training in preparing women for the formal culture of parliamentary work, create real obstacles to women being taken seriously in the South African legislature. She cites Mahau Phekoe of the Women's National Coalition: "*At the last budget speech, three women commented on the budget. One read a speech written in English. She struggled with what she had to say ...Comments were made on her bad delivery. The other two had done no research. This discredited these women.*" Of course, getting more women into public office has always been connected to a wider project of deepening democracy. In this broader democratic project, a challenge for feminists has been to develop a distinct political community of women, and to articulate interest in and around gender-based injustices. Indeed, part of this project has been the recognition that the pursuit of equality and social justice calls not only for broader-based representation of women in formal political arenas, but also for the democratization of other domains and institutions, including the private sphere. It is precisely here that the limits of the feminist project have been most acutely felt, when it became evident that large numbers of women in public office may perform an important role-modelling effect, but beyond that, few feminists make it into or survive in formal politics, and it is enormously difficult for them to have a tangible impact on policy-making. Two issues arise here that deserve further attention. The first is the question of how women enter politics. What are women's pathways into political office? How and where do women learn the arts and activities of politics? How is political apprenticeship itself gendered? The second relates to the nature of the public sphere institutions in which women do participate, in the wake of waves of governance reform over the course of the last decades. To what extent have democratic reforms provided new opportunities to address issues of gender justice? (Cornwall and Goetz, 2005: 785)

If we address each of these issues in turn, women's political and democratic apprenticeship will put forward very important issues to consider. Political participation matters a great deal for women. It does so not only because of the potential gains of successful protest, because of mobilization around collective interests, advocacy or engagement in policy processes. It also offers women a form of political apprenticeship that enables them to recognize and articulate interests, build alliances, broker differences and learn modes of cooperation and consensus building to advance common projects. In addition, for participation to yield influence, to sway others in deliberative processes, an apprenticeship in democratic practices is useful – a training in the ability to mount an argument and to debate effectively, to tolerate opposition and to accept setbacks and failure. Women who move on to formal political arenas can apply the political arts learnt through these forms of participation. Looking at women's pathways into politics, however, making that transition appears far from straightforward. There is no shortage of women's activity – and indeed leadership – in civil society and community activism. Why, then, do these spaces produce so few feminist leaders able to make the transition into formal representative politics and be effective in influencing policy? The traditional incubators of political leaders have been trade unions, campus politics and political parties. They are also the crucibles in which interests are identified, debated, aggregated and promoted. These arenas foster styles of politics and forms of political apprenticeship that can exclude and silence women. Though women participate, they have often found themselves relegated to lower levels in hierarchies and to community mobilization work. Political parties in particular have rarely assigned priority to gender issues or promoted women as candidates for office without being formally obliged to do so. Women in many countries

form the bulk of the ‘foot soldiers’ in campaigning and fund-raising, but parties the world over appear hostile to women’s engagement in decision-making, especially at top leadership levels (Cornwall and Goetz, 2005: 787-789).

Proof of the stubborn resistance of parties to women’s leadership is their unwillingness to introduce internal leadership quotas. In Africa, only the African National Congress (ANC) has a quota for women in its National Executive Committee. Four parties in Brazil have internal quotas, and these remain the only ones to have more than 10 per cent of women in their leadership. Even then, quotas are treated as strict ceilings, not entry points. The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil, for instance, has filled, exactly, but never surpassed its 30 per cent quota of women in the national executive for over 10 years. What matters for what issues are represented is how women are selected for these leadership positions and for participation at other levels, and the uses to which they hope to put this participation. Where resources, candidacies and positions in parties are determined by patronage, where there is no transparency or internal accountability in decisions about who leads and what policies are promoted, we ought not to expect women leaders, if they emerge, to be connected to gender equality concerns. Parties organized on the basis of patronage, or indeed a kleptocratic operation of a single powerful family, are often found in developing-country contexts. Such parties often have highly personalized leadership systems based on family dynasties, and decision-making is not open to internal challenge. Women’s political apprenticeship within such systems involve exploiting kinship connections. Where a woman has gained position within a party via such a route, there is less chance that she will seek connections with organized feminism or other expressions of women’s concerns in civil society, or challenge the masculine party hierarchy by supporting gender causes. ‘Women’s wings’ of political parties have rarely provided the essential incubating ground for women leaders, for female solidarity in parties, and for feminist policy proposals. Instead, women’s wings are commonly captured by the spouses of male leaders and have developed a species of female sycophancy (Tsikata, 2001). In west and east African countries, women’s wings in dominant parties have sought to control and contain the wider women’s movement, harnessing women’s energies to support the president. Nana Konadu Agyeman Rawlings’s 31 December Women’s Movement in Ghana was a notorious example, but similar efforts by political spouses to monopolize international resources for women’s development and to limit women’s independent associational activity has rightly made women wary of engagement with politics and parties (Tripp, 1999).

As our analysis suggests, the boundaries between political spaces are far more blurred than political theory would have us believe. Similarities between constraints to women’s political influence in both traditional and ‘new democratic spaces’ draw attention to the need to facilitate opportunities for political apprenticeship alongside that of creating the conditions for the effective articulation of positions that challenge the status quo. Inclusion at this point matters for us. Given that pressures for democratization almost - and always- arise from civil society opposition, Dryzek (1996: 475-487) notes, a shift from opposition to engagement can lead to the reduction of the prospects for further democratization. Unless directly connected with state imperatives, the democratic gains of incorporation are questionable: “*To the extent that public policy remains under the sway of state imperatives, groups whose inclusion coincides with no imperative will not easily acquire the tangible goods they value. They may be allowed to participate in the policymaking process, but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them ...A high price will be paid by any group included on this basis... Inclusion in the life of the state is,*

then, bought at the expense of relatively unrestricted democratic interplay in the oppositional public sphere."

Further concerns about the terms for inclusion in contemporary democratic politics are posed by Chantal Mouffe (2002: 3-9), who argues that neo-liberalism and the conflation of politics with morality in the turn to deliberative democratic mechanisms signals 'the retreat of the political'. She contends that: "*…the political is from the outset concerned with collective forms of identification; the political always has to do with the formation of an 'Us' as opposed to a 'Them', with conflict and antagonism ...the very condition of possibility of the formation of political identities is at the same time the impossibility of a society from which antagonism has been eliminated.*" Both the aggregative and deliberative models of democratic political theory, she argues, 'leave aside the central role of 'passions' in the creation of collective political identities'. Crucial to democratic politics, she argues, is how the establishment of an 'Us' can be compatible with pluralism: this, she contends, requires the transformation of antagonism into agonism: "*In the agonistic model, the prime task of democratic politics is neither to eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in order to establish a rational consensus in the public sphere; it is, rather, to 'tame' these passions by mobilizing them for democratic ends and by creating collective forms of identification around democratic objectives.*"

Recognizing that 'invited spaces' may serve as much to divert and dissipate social and political energy as provide productive spaces for engagement calls for circumspection by international donor agencies. That is to say, should their enthusiasm for creating spaces for institutionalized participation be tempered in the light of the evident reproduction of existing political culture and constraints to inclusion within many such spaces? (Cornwall, 2004: 1-10) Feminist organizations have a key role to play in broadening opportunities for the articulation of gender-transformative agendas in both traditional and 'new democratic spaces'. Yet, time-consuming and inflexible donor procedures and the dampening effects of projectization of funding create significant obstacles. Where feminist movements or NGOs strategize across projectized initiatives, they may be able to overcome some of these obstacles; but the amount of effort absorbed in meeting the demands of donors and shoe-horning projects to fit their funding categories can work to undermine the political agency and efficacy of such organizations. Less structured support given in solidarity rather than in response to LogFramed project proposals could make a broader difference to the democratizing potential of these kinds of organizations.

Lastly, our analysis has highlighted the significance of other spaces outside the formal political or deliberative arenas, which can incubate leaders, and in which women can formulate positions, exchange perspectives and hone political skills, as do Margaret Kohn and Nancy Fraser, among others. There are important lessons to be learnt from initiatives such as Brazil's 'escolas feministas' that seek to work with women within public office as well as to build the capabilities as feminists of would-be politicians and women representatives in other democratic spaces. Yet for these spaces to produce political actors who are effective within the political arenas described in this account, it is vital that such 'laboratories' move beyond the conflation of identity with identification. This calls for what Adams (2002) describes as a new politics of 'self-interest', one that borrows from Arendt's (1958) notion of 'inter-est' as that 'which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together. Such sites would serve 'not merely to articulate different identities and agendas, but to instrumentalize those differences towards the formulation of new identities, new agendas, new alliances, and new political forms' (Adams, 2002: 2). It is in the use of these spaces to develop bridges into the political arena – developing the bases for new alliances, as well as offering opportunities for

political learning – that the challenges of democratizing democracy can perhaps begin to be addressed.

Concluding Reflections

Around the world, concepts and constructions of democracy are under renewed contestation since the years of 2000s. However, those promotion efforts of democracy had brought pains, sufferings, grievances and tears to many societies. Those demanding more democracy in global processes occupy streets; in small villages and neighborhoods, grassroots groups are claiming their places in local democratic spaces. Democracy is at once the language of military power, neoliberal market forces, political parties, social movements, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Everyone asked each other what is going on. Thus, in this study, we tried to pick up one strand of the democracy debate associated with what is known in some circles as 'deepening democracy' through societies of democracy. This strand, simply put, focuses on the political project of developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone.

The study came with a number of qualifications. As known, the democracy literature is a vast one, and we have not tried to review or cover all of it. Rather, for the sake of stimulating discussion, and for introducing people to some of the debate, we attempted to briefly explore a conceptual review of "which democracy"; reviewed comparison of "society of democracy" vs. "democratic society" through a theoretical perspectives on political participation. Then we posed some questions and challenges, which emerge from local to global in line with the democracy's resilience in a changing world and societal order of today. We reviewed from the literature and practice for how patterns of participation vs. harmony of participation in a "society of democracy" could be deepened further. We offered in this context some perspectives on democratizing societal democracy exploring concept of "engendering democracy" in order to achieve 'civil society' democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, empowered participatory governance.

As Gaventa (2006) emphasized, in reading the literature on democracy, we are confronted with a paradox. On the one hand, there is the somewhat triumphalist view that democracy has spread as never before. At the end of the twentieth century, we are told, there were ostensibly 120 electoral democracies in place (out of 192 existing countries), of which some 85 were thought to be 'full' democracies, in the sense that they provided respect for rule of law, civil and political rights. Quoting such data, a report by Freedom House declares the twentieth century as the 'Democratic Century' (Freedom House, 1999). On the other hand, from other sources one gets the sense that democracy is in crisis, faced by a series of democratic deficits, which are calling its very vitality and meaning into question. For the triumphalists democracy-building is about spread and quantity, and largely about creating a standardised recipe of institutional designs around the world. For those concerned with its deficits, democracy is not only about spread, it is also about deepening its quality and meanings in ways appropriate to the settings in which it is found. Indeed, this study argued, both perspectives may be correct – while the institutional forms and procedures of democracy increasingly may be in place, the critical challenge now is how to deepen their inclusiveness and substance, especially in terms of how citizens engage within democratic spaces to create more just and equitable states and societies.

In exploring these themes, we concluded that democracy-building in a "society of democracy" is an ongoing process of struggle and contestation rather than the adoption of a standard recipe of institutional designs. Democracy building work for the next century

involves going beyond current formulations to find and promote those new and emerging visions and movements for democracy, which will extend and deepen its meanings and practices towards full citizen engagement yet further.

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